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Notes
Copyright Protection for Computer Screen Displays
A corporation, C1, develops and copyrights a computer pro-
gram, Orchestra, which performs various accounting tasks. C1
commits considerable creative resources to developing screen
displays for Orchestra that make the program visually pleasing
and easy to learn and use. Desiring to insure that the screen
display will be copyright protected, C1 applies for independent,
copyright registration1 of Orchestra's screens. The Copyright
Office denies the application, maintaining that the copyright in
the underlying program also protects the screens. A competi-
tor, C2, subsequently develops and markets an accounting pro-
gram significantly less expensive than Orchestra, which it
names Band. Although the underlying programs are entirely
different, C2 has designed the screen display of Band to be suf-
ficiently similar to Orchestra's that a user familiar with Orches-
tra would find it easy to use Band. Because the introduction of
Band threatens Orchestra's market share, CI sues C2 for copy-
right infringement of its screen displays. In defense, C2 chal-
lenges Cl's copyright in its screens.
Computer program developers have great incentive to pro-
tect their own programs' screen displays as well as to adopt and
modify the screens of other successful programs. Yet current
copyright law and Copyright Office policies give developers
such as C1 and C2 little guidance by which to assess the merits
1. Although "[c]opyright in a work... subsists from its creation" (Copy-
right Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982)), three formalities are necessary to
insure copyright protection: notice, registration, and deposit. A copyrighted
work that is publicly distributed by its owner must contain a "reasonable no-
tice of the claim." Id. at § 401. Regulations governing notice for specific types
of works are detailed in 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1987). Registration provides prima
facie evidence of the validity of a copyright claim (17 U.S.C. § 410(c)) and is a
prerequisite to any action for infringement (17 U.S.C. § 411(a)). An author reg-
isters a work by filing with the Copyright Office a Form TX for literary works
or a Form PA for audiovisual works. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b). An application fee
($10) and deposit of the work must accompany the form. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408,
708(a)(1). For a discussion of the deposit requirements for screen displays, see
infra note 134.
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of their respective claims. The Copyright Office 2 and one fed-
eral district court 3 maintain that an underlying program's copy-
right protects the screen displays that the program generates.
The only other and most recent court to explicitly address this
question, however, held that a program's copyright does not
protect its screens.4 Furthermore, the few courts that have ad-
dressed copyright protection for a program's screen displays
have given conflicting guidance as to the degree of similarity
between screens necessary for a court to find infringement. Un-
til the uncertainty is resolved, software firms cannot be confi-
dent of their ability either to protect the screens they develop
or to borrow, adapt, and improve upon screen formats intro-
duced by others.
This Note examines copyright protection for nongame com-
puter screen displays. Part I outlines the legal principles gov-
erning copyright protection and reviews the cases that have
addressed copyright protection of computer software. Part II
analyzes the current judicial conflict as to whether a computer
program's copyright protects the screen displays generated by it
and considers the appropriate scope of that protection. Part III
proposes a framework for resolving copyrightability problems
of computer screen displays. This Note concludes that screen
displays should be protected by their own copyright rather than
a copyright in their underlying program to ensure adequate
protection of the valuable creative work in screens. The Note
further concludes that such protection should be very limited
in scope to avoid detrimental restrictions on the options avail-
able to screen designers.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
A. COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO THE PROTECTION OF
COMPUTER SCREEN DISPLAYS
The scope of copyright protection for computer screen dis-
plays depends on the application of the goals and principles un-
derlying copyright law. The goal of copyright protection is to
enrich society by encouraging authors to develop and dissemi-
2. See discussion infra note 94 and accompanying text.
3. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 1986). See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
4. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987). See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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nate new works. 5 In a technological context, copyright must
give sufficient protection to encourage innovation and develop-
ment without stifling competition or chilling incremental devel-
opment by granting overly broad protection.6
Three foundational principles that govern copyright protec-
tion address the distinction between copyrightable and un-
copyrightable material. First, protection extends only to
"original works of authorship."7 Unoriginal creations are not
5. Congress legislates in this area according to its constitutional mandate
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Court in Mazer v. Stein suc-
cinctly summarized the purpose of copyright legislation:
"The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the
owner a secondary consideration." However, it is "intended definitely
to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., with-
out burdensome requirements; 'to afford greater encouragement to
the production of literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the
world.'"
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
131, 158 (1948); Washingtonian Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
6. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, Copyright and Software Technology In-
fringement. Defining Third Party Development Rights, 62 IND. L.J. 13, 13-14
(1987).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). The Copyright Act lists seven categories of
works which qualify as works of authorship: literary works; musical works;
dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and sound re-
cordings. Id. Two of the categories important to computer software copyright
are literary works and audiovisual works. See id. The statute defines literary
works as:
works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature
of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, pho-
norecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Audiovisual works are defined as:
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically
intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as pro-
jectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying
sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
Id.
Courts have classified computer programs as literary works. E.g., Apple
Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[A]
computer program, whether in object code or source code, is a 'literary work'
.... "), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
Video game screen displays are regarded as audiovisual works. See infra
note 59. Nongame screens have been classified both as audiovisual works, see
Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
and infra note 97, and literary works, see Digital Communications Assocs. v.
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 462 (N.D. Ga 1987) and infra note
84.
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copyrightable. Originality, however, does not require that a
work be novel or unique, only that it reflect independent ef-
fort.8 The degree of originality or creativity a work must evi-
dence to bring it within the ambit of protection is quite
minimal,9 although certain forms of expression are so lacking
in creativity that they do not merit protection.10
Second, copyrightability only extends to works that are
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression."'" A work quali-
fies as fixed as long as it is embodied in some physical medium
such as a book, record, tape, or computer disk.'2 That a tape
player, computer, or other piece of technology is necessary to
perceive the work has no bearing on its copyrightability.13
8. Even a new work of authorship that is identical to an existing work
would be a proper subject for copyright protection if the second work was cre-
ated independently of the first. See, e.g., Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218; Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[I]f by some magic a
man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian
Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy
that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's."); Fred Fisher, Inc. v.
Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.); H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEwS 5659, 5664 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
9. The standard generally adopted is that the author's contribution be
more than "merely trivial." 1 M. Nnaus, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.01[B] at
2-11 (1987).
10. Some examples include short phrases or sentence fragments, charts,
forms, simple sequences of musical notes, and numbering systems. Id. at 2-14
to -14.1. See also United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978). The
court in Hamilton commented:
Trivial elements of compilation and arrangement, of course, are not
copyrightable since they fall below the threshold of originality. For
example, it is well-settled that copyright of a map does not give the
author an exclusive right to the coloring, symbols, and key used in de-
lineating boundaries of and locations within the territory depicted.
Id. at 451. Lack of requisite creativity is one rationale for refusing to extend
copyright protection to blank forms, but they may also be denied protection as
utilitarian works. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). The fixation requirement is perhaps best un-
derstood by reference to what does not qualify as fixed. "[T]he definition of
'fixation' would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient re-
productions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically
on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the
'memory' of a computer." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 53, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5666.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 52, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5666.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). This statutory provision was added to revise
the Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1076, which had incorporated the
holding of White-Smith Music Publ. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (hold-
ing that piano roll embodying musical composition did not infringe author's
copyright because coded punches were not humanly perceptible without the
1126 [Vol. 72:1123
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Third, copyright protection extends only to the expression
of ideas and does not include the ideas themselves.1 4 Courts
have struggled to distinguish protected expression from unpro-
tected idea.15 Because decisions are necessarily specific to the
work involved, a general rule for distinguishing idea from ex-
pression is usually not practicable. 16 Depending upon the level
of abstraction at which courts choose to define the idea of a
aid of mechanical device). HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 52, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5665; 1 NIMMER, supra note 9,
§ 2.03[B], at 2-29.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)
("[A] copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given
only to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself."). The court in Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1977), states:
It is an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to a copy-
righted work extends only to the particular expression of the idea and
never to the idea itself. This principle attempts to reconcile two com-
peting social interests: rewarding an individual's creativity and effort
while at the same time permitting the nation to enjoy the benefits
and progress from use of the same subject matter.
Id. at 1163 (citations omitted).
An example from a video game case illustrates the distinction between
idea and expression. In Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., the
court defined the unprotected idea of the video game PAC-MAN as "a maze-
chase game in which the player scores points by guiding a central figure
through various passageways of a maze and at the same time avoiding collision
with certain opponents or pursuit figures which move independently about the
maze." 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). The court
labeled the depiction of the central figure as a "gobbler" and the pursuit
figures as "ghost monsters" protected expression. Id.
Courts generally determine which aspects of a work constitute unpro-
tected idea and which constitute protected expression when they consider
whether the alleged infringing work is "substantially similar" to the copy-
righted work 1 NMma, supra note 9, § 2.03[D], at 2-34; § 13.03, at 13-20. To
the extent any similarity is due to shared idea, there is no infringement. 1d.
§ 2.18, at 2-219.
In an action for copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove two ele-
ments: ownership of the copyright and copying by the defendant. Sid &
Marty Krofft Television, 562 F.2d at 1162. Substantial similarity arises in con-
nection with the latter element, copying. Copying is established by showing
that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the defend-
ant's work is substantially similar to it. Id.
15. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 65
(3d Cir.) (stating that identifying what is copyrightable expression and what is
unprotected idea in any given work is necessarily very subjective process in
which precision is "rarely possible"), cert denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
16. Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960) ('"e test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague.... Ob-
viously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc.").
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work, the work receives very broad or very limited copyright
protection.' 7 Courts' perceptions of how broad copyright pro-
tection ought to be, as a matter of social policy, in a given type
of work often dictate where they finally draw the line between
idea and expression.'8
Courts severely limit the scope of copyright protection
when they conclude that a work's idea has merged into the ex-
pression of that idea.' 9 Merger problems arise when a creator
seeks to copyright a work that embodies ideas capable of only a
very limited range of expression. For example, a recent court
severely limited protection of synthetic heads of elephants,
zebras, and other wild animals, reasoning that any similarity of
expression shared by the heads was indispensible to their com-
mon idea-realistic depiction of the animal.20 Courts are reluc-
tant to grant copyright protection when the idea and expression
are so closely identified, because protection risks giving the
17. Judge Hand, in an oft-quoted comment, explains the fluidity inherent
in the idea-expression dichotomy due to the various levels of abstraction at
which the idea might be defined:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of pat-
terns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more
of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the
most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might
consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the play-
wright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been
able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citing
Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1929)).
18. See, e.g., Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1253 (3d Cir. 1983) ("We believe that in the context before us, a program for
an operating system, the line must be a pragmatic one, which also keeps in
consideration 'the preservation of the balance between competition and protec-
tion reflected in the patent and copyright laws.' ") (quoting Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)), cert dismissed,
464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
19. Toro Co. v. R & R Prods., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986).
20. Rachel v. Banana Republic, 831 F.2d 1503, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987). The
court branded expression that is inseparable from the work's idea as "indis-
pensible expression" and articulated a "virtual identity" standard for infringe-
ment for such cases rather than the usual standard of substantial similarity.
Id. (citing Frybarger v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Related to the merger doctrine is the concept of scenes a faire. Scenes a
faire are "incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter in-
dispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic." Hoehling
v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980). See, e.g., Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 617 (7th Cir.) (treating maze, scoring table, tunnel exits, and scoring of
11128 [Vol. 72:1123
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owner exclusive rights in the idea.2 '
Courts also give only limited protection to utilitarian
works, whose value lies in their usefulness rather than in the
information they convey.22 Courts, for example, have found
time planners,23 forms used by repairers,24 and graphs for
charting temperature2 uncopyrightable as utilitarian works. 26
Blank forms are usually denied protection as utilitarian
points by consuming dots used by PAC-MAN game's video screen as scenes a
faire), cer denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
Scenes a faire may be held uncopyrightable as a matter of law, Hoehling,
618 F.2d at 979, or may be protected only from virtually identical copying,
Atari, 672 F.2d at 617.
21. The court in Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir.
1967), explained the rationale behind the merger doctrine:
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that "the
topic necessarily requires," if not only one form of expression, at best
only a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a
party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could ex-
haust all possibilities of future use of the substance.... Mhe subject
matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its
expression.
Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted); see also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusing to find copyright in-
fringement of jewel-encrusted bee-shaped pin because idea of bee pin is insep-
arable from its expression). The Kalpakian court explained, "When the 'idea'
and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be
barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a
monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and
limitations imposed by the patent law." Id.; cf. Toro, 787 F.2d at 1212 (willing
to preclude copyright protection for works capable of only limited forms of ex-
pression, but concluding that idea of parts numbering system was capable of
sufficient quantity of varying expressions so as to allow plaintiff's system to be
copyrightable).
22. 1 NmER, supra note 9, § 2.18[A], at 2-195 to -196.
23. Januz Mktg. Communications v. Doubleday & Co., 569 F. Supp. 76, 80
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (daily planning and time organizer chart not copyrightable).
24. M.M. Business Forms v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137, 1140 (6th Cir. 1973)
(forms used by television repairers not copyrightable).
25. Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir.
1943) (graphs for charting temperature not copyrightable), cert denied, 321
U.S. 785 (1944); Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 911 (D.C. Cir.)
(graphs for charting temperature and atmospheric pressure not copyrightable),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947).
26. But see Continental Casualty v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir.)
(forms for blanket bond copyrightable because they convey some information),
cert denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958); Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K.'Wil-
liams & Co.-East, 377 F. Supp. 418, 428 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (record-keeping book
copyrightable because text material used to instruct reader in use of forms
conveyed information), aff'd, 542 F. 2d. 1053 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 433
U.S. 908 (1977); Harcourt Brace & World v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F.
Supp. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (answer sheets designed for SAT tests
copyrightable).
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works,27 but they might also lack the requisite creativity to sur-
vive the threshold requirement of originality.28 Copyright pro-
tection of utilitarian works is limited because broad protection
would risk granting the owner a monopoly over the idea, pro-
cess, or system described or embodied in the work.29
In sum, courts determine the boundaries of copyright pro-
tection by distinguishing original from unoriginal works and
expression from idea.30 Moreover, courts severely limit the
27. Copyright protection is not extended to "[w]ords designed for record-
ing information which do not in themselves convey infornation, such as time
cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank checks, score cards, address
books, report forms, order forms, and the like." Cash Dividend Check Corp. v.
Davis, 247 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1957) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (1959))
(emphasis in original).
28. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
29. The seminal case on the treatment of utilitarian works is Baker v. Sel-
den, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In that case the Court refused to recognize copyright
protection in specially designed bookkeeping forms which were embodied in a
copyrighted book describing the system. The Court reasoned:
The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains.
But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be
used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book. And where the
art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and dia-
grams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such
methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to
the art, and given therewith to the public ....
Id. at 103.
Professor Nimmer restates the "original doctrine" of Baker as follows:
[W]here the use of the "art," i.e., the idea, which a copyrighted work
explains (or embodies) necessarily requires a copying of the work it-
self, then such copying will not constitute an infringement of copy-
right. However, if such copying occurs not in using the art but rather
in explaining it, then such copying will constitute an infringement.
1 NimNER, supra note 9, § 2.18[B], at 2-199.
30. One class of works, useful articles, are given a statutory analysis in-
dependent of idea-expression considerations. A useful article is "an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the ap-
pearance of the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
Although a useful article is not itself copyrightable, the design or aesthetic fea-
tures of a useful article, such as a piece of sculpture used as a lamp base, may
be copyrightable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, but only to the ex-
tent that such features have artistic significance independent of and separable
from their utility. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (holding copy-
right protects statuettes embodied in lamp but not utilitarian aspects of lamp).
The statute defines a pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works as follows:
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimen-
sional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art,
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, tech-
nical drawings, diagrams, and models. Such works shall include
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful
1130 [Vol. 72:1123
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scope of the work's protection when the expression and idea of
the work are closely related or its value is principally utilita-
rian rather than communicative.
B. TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND
SCREENS
Application of copyright law principles to the challenging
issues presented by computer screen displays requires some ba-
sic understanding of computer programs and screens. A com-
puter program is a set of coded instructions that directs the
computer to perform specified operations.31 Developing a com-
puter program involves a four-step process. The programmer
first must define the problem, that is, determine the precise
task the program is to perform.3 2 Then the programmer cre-
ates a flow chart that diagrams the overall structure and logic
of the program.33 The programmer next writes the program in
linear fashion in one of the computer languages employed by
programmers such as BASIC, FORTRAN, or COBOL.3 A pro-
gram written in one of these programming languages is termed
source code.35 Finally, because a computer cannot "read"
source code, a source code program must be translated into ob-
article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only V, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added). The emphasized language incorpo-
rates the holding of Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (extending copyright protection to
sculpted figures incorporated into lamp base). The statute intends to "draw as
clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and un-
copyrighted works of industrial design." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 55,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5668; see also Gay Toys
v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1983) (toy airplane has no "intrin-
sic utilitarian function" and therefore is not subject to copyright limitations
imposed by useful articles analysis); Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d
890, 893 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying copyright protection to carpet display folder
and commenting, "[I]f an article has any intrinsic utilitarian function, it can be
denied copyright protection except to the extent that its artistic features can
be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of
art."); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)
(design on belt buckle copyrightable under useful article doctrine).
31. Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1724-25 (1983).
32. 1 D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: SOFT ARE PROTECTION § 2.06[3], at 2-
118.3 to -118.4 (1987).
33. Id. § 2.06[3], at 2-119 to -124.
34. Id. § 2.06[3], at 2-130 to -141; Note, supra note 31, at 1724-25.
35. Note, supra note 31, at 1724-25.
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ject code, the binary (machine) language that is capable of di-
recting the computer.36
Programs are classified either as operating system pro-
grams or application programs.3 7 An operating system program
manages the internal operations of the computer (such as rout-
ing information and allocating memory) and enables it to func-
tion.38 Application programs organize the computer's raw
capabilities to interact with a user and perform specific tasks
such as word processing, accounting, or playing a game.39
The manner in which the application program and its user
communicate is commonly called the user interface. A pro-
gram typically communicates to the user through its screen dis-
plays. Because a typical user's only contact with an application
program is through the screens it generates, efficient, easy to
use, and visually pleasing screen displays are essential to a pro-
gram's success in the marketplace.40 As a result, developers in-
vest considerable creative energy in the design of the screens
generated by their programs, often using teams of engineers,
artists, psychologists, and ergonomists to produce the designs.4'
Thus, the screen design may be authored independently of the
actual program code. Programmers often author only the pro-
gram code that generates on the screen the design created by
the screen engineers. Because there are many ways to write a
program that will produce the same screen display, developers
are just as interested in protecting the screens themselves from
imitation as they are in protecting the underlying program.42
C. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The Copyright Office first allowed copyright registration
for computer programs in 1964, but because it had serious
doubts as to the copyrightability of programs, the Office im-
posed strict limits on their registration.43 Congress explicitly
36. Ici; 1 D. BENDER, supra note 32, § 2.06[3], at 2-125. This translation is
normally accomplished via an "assembler" or "compiler" program. Id. app. at
4A-196.
37. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); 1 D. BENDER, supra note 32,
§ 2.06[3], at 2-117.
38. 1 D. BENDER, supra note 32, § 2.06[3], at 2-117 to -118.2.
39. Id. § 2.06[3], at 2-118.2 to -118.3.
40. Reback & Hayes, A Modest Proposal for the Registration of Computer
Screen Displays, COMPUTER LAw., Aug. 1987, at 2.
41. Id. at 8. See infra note 128.
42. Reback & Hayes, supra note 40, at 2, 5.
43. The reservations of the Copyright Office about computer programs
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extended copyright protection to computer programs with pas-
sage of the 1980 Computer Service Copyright Act.44 Although
were reflected in three strict prerequisites to copyrightability: the program
had to contain a significant amount of original authorship, the registrant had
to publish the program with proper notice of copyright, and the registrant
must have deposited copies of the program in humanly readable form with the
office. Copyright Office Circular 31 D (Jan. 1965), reprinted in Davidson, Pro-
tecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARiz. ST. L.J.
611, 652 n.72 (final report of Committee on Proprietary Protection of Software,
ABA Section on Science and Technology). The Copyright Office was espe-
cially concerned about whether a computer program qualified as a "writing of
an author" as required by the Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1076. Address by R. Oman, Register of Copyrights (Jan. 1987), reprinted in 28
IDEA 29, 29 (1987).
The Copyright Office registered only three programs in 1964, 16 in 1965,
and a total of 2000 programs by the end of 1977. NATIONAL CONM'N ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 15 (1978) [here-
inafter CONTU FINAL REPORT]; see also Davidson, supra, at 652 n.72 (most of
those 2000 programs were registered by two companies, IBM and Burroughs).
The Copyright Act of 1976 liberalized the requirements of copyright pro-
tection generally, but the Act explicitly provided that it intended no change in
the law of software copyright. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541, 2565 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117). Congress intended to
freeze the status of computer program copyrightability until it received the re-
port of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU). HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5731. Congress established CONTU in 1974 to
study intellectual property issues posed by new technology, including com-
puter programs. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873.
CONTU's recommendations concerning the copyrightability of software were
incorporated into the 1980 Computer Service Copyright Act. See injfra note 44.
44. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117
(1982)). The Act specifically brought programs within the embrace of copy-
right protection by adding the definition of program which was recommended
by CONTU to 17 U.S.C. § 101: "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result." Id.
CONTU drafted this definition of a computer program and recommended
that it be added to the definitional section of the Copyright Act as a means of
bringing computer programs explicitly within the ambit of the Copyright Act
of 1976. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 1, 12.
CONTU based its recommendation that computer programs be granted
copyright protection on three findings. First, the expansion of copyright pro-
tection to computer programs is consistent with the continually expanding
scope of copyright as illustrated by its statutory history. Id. at 15. Second,
copyrightability of programs is consistent with the expansive wording of the
1976 Act and the Congressional history accompanying that Act. I.& at 16.
Third, copyright is the best of available methods to protect the work while not
inhibiting development and dissemination. Id. at 12, 16-19.
The CONTU report has been sharply criticized for recommending copy-
right protection for all forms of computer programs. Critics argue that copy-
right traditionally has protected and should continue to protect only works of
authorship that communicate to human beings. To extend copyright, as
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the courts have reached a consensus that the 1980 Act evi-
denced the clear intention of Congress to extend copyright pro-
tection to all forms of computer programs, 45 courts have not
agreed on what aspects of the program represent uncopyright-
CONTU suggests, to programs in machine-readable computer code (object
code) has therefore been criticized as ignoring the proper limits of copyright
law. Id. at 28-30 (Comm'r Hersey, dissenting).
It has also been suggested that because software is designed to run a com-
puter, not communicate to the operator, CONTU should have given more con-
sideration to whether programs may be utilitarian works that are not a proper
subject of copyright. Id. at 26-27 (Comm'r Nimmer, concurring); Samuelson,
CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Pro-
grams in Machine-Readable Form, 63 DUKE L.J. 663, 704 (1984). Hersey com-
mented, "It is not said that the programs describe or give instructions for the
functions of the computer. They control them. This is the mechanical fact."
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 28 (emphasis in original). For the
contrasting approach, which argues that current copyright law is appropriate
for the protection of software and is effectively being applied by the courts in
computer program cases, see Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legisla-
tion Protecting Computer Software, 47 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1131 (1986).
45. In Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., the Third Circuit
gave the most comprehensive treatment to this question and established the
generally accepted legal standard. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed,
464 U.S. 1033 (1984). Franklin held that the 1980 Act extended copyright pro-
tection to the computer's operating system existing in object code and embod-
ied in ROM (Read Only Memory). Id. at 1249-52. In other words, the court
extended protection to a program in binary code readable only by the com-
puter, designed to run the computer rather than communicate in any fashion
to the user, and preserved in the form of a miniature printed circuit embedded
in a microchip.
The district court in Franklin had expressed strong reservations concern-
ing the copyrightability of operating systems expressed in object code. Apple
Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 821 (E.D. Penn. 1982),
rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). It rea-
soned that the ROM chip was a utilitarian article whose purpose was not to
convey information but to perform a function, and thus it was excluded from
protection by the Baker v. Selden doctrine. Id. at 821. The district court also
was concerned that the operating system was outside the ambit of traditional
copyright protection because its expression communicated solely to the
machine rather than to any person. Id. at 824. The district court attempted to
distinguish Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983), which recognized the copyrightability of object code,
on the grounds that the object code in that case had a communicative purpose
because it ran the video game display. 545 F. Supp. at 824-25.
The Court of Appeals in Franklin disagreed. It construed the 1976 Act as
eliminating any need for a copyrightable work to be communicative to human
beings. 714 F.2d at 1248. It also rejected the lower court's interpretation of the
Baker v. Selden doctrine limiting copyright to that which is nonfunctional.
The court found support for narrowly reading Baker in the CONTU report
and in the definition of computer program added to 17 U.S.C. § 101 in 1980. Id.
at 1252. That definition is a functional one and is therefore an obstacle to the
"utilitarian purpose" objection to program copyrightability. It reads, "A 'com-
puter program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indi-
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able idea and what aspects represent copyrightable expression.
Courts readily find infringement when the defendant has cop-
ied the plaintiff's literal computer code.4 Sharp disagreement
remains, however, over whether the manner in which com-
puter instructions are organized, sequenced, and structured in a
program is uncopyrightable idea or protected expression.
The seminal case addressing the copyrightability of the se-
quence in which computer instructions are presented is
Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co.47  The
plaintiff had designed a sequence for entering information into
a computer which was intended to make a complex engineering
program easier to use.48 This sequence was contained on a se-
ries of copyrighted cards that were to be followed in a specific
order.49 The defendant designed a computer program struc-
tured around these same input formats.5 0 The court in
Synercom refused to find copyright infringement, holding that
the sequence of input formats was an uncopyrightable idea.51
In a recent and influential opinion, the Third Circuit in
Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory52 declined to
follow Synercom and granted broad copyright protection to
computer programs by extending protection to a program's
"structure, sequence, and organization."5 3 The court reached
this expansive holding by defining the idea of a program as its
function and its expression as those features of a program
nonessential to that function.4 The plaintiff in Whelan had
designed a program called Dentalab to manage the record-
rectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982) (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1251 (literal coded instructions are
copyright protected but not methods or processes).
47. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
48. Id. at 1005.
49. Id
50. Id. at 1006.
51. Id. at 1013. The Synercom court reasoned,
As noted "in cases of literary or artistic works, and works of simi-
lar character, in which the form, arrangement, or combination of
ideas represents the product of labor and skilled effort separate and
apart from that entailed in the development of the intellectual concep-
tion involved," copyright protection is available. Here if order and se-
quence is the expression, the skilled effort is not separable for the
form, arrangement, and combination is itself the intellectual concep-
tion involved.
Id. at 1014 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
52. 797 F.2d. 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
53. Id at 1248.
54. Id. at 1236. The court reasoned. "[The purpose or function of a utili-
1988] 1135
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
keeping functions of a dental laboratory.5 5 The court identified
the function of the plaintiff's program-its uncopyrightable
idea- as "the efficient organization of a dental laboratory."ss
The plaintiff's copyrightable expression of this idea, the court
found, was the particular manner in which the plaintiff struc-
tured the logic of the program. Because more than one means
of structuring a program to manage a dental laboratory exists,
the court reasoned, Dentalab's structure was not essential to
that function and therefore met the court's definition of expres-
sion.57 Although not followed uniformly,58 the Whelan court's
function test, with its broad grant of protection to structure, se-
quence, and organization, has influenced later decisions con-
cerning computer screen copyright.
D. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SCREENS
1. Video Games
Courts first explored the copyright relationship between a
tarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to
that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea." Id.
55. Id, at 1225.
56. Id. at 1240.
57. The court concluded, "Because there are a variety of program struc-
tures through which that idea can be expressed, the structure is not a neces-
sary incident to that idea." Id.
58. The Fifth Circuit declined to wholly embrace Whelan's extension of
copyright protection to a program's structure, sequence, and organization. In
Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987), the court, choosing to follow Synercom's re-
strictive rule rather than Whelan's expansive one, held that the structure, se-
quence, and organization of a cotton marketing program likely constituted an
uncopyrightable idea. Id. at 1262. The court in Plains Cotton concluded.-
We decline to embrace Whelan for two reasons. First, the issue is
presented to us on review of a denial of a motion for preliminary in-
junction. Thus, the record is only partially developed, and our review
is one step removed from the actual merits of the case. Second, appel-
lees presented evidence that many of the similarities between the
GEMS and Telcot programs are dictated by the externalities of the
cotton market.... The record supports the inference that market fac-
tors play a significant role in determining the sequence and organiza-
tion of cotton marketing software, and we decline to hold that those
patterns cannot constitute "ideas" in a computer context.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Note that this analysis assumes that the sequence and organization of the
manner in which the program interacts with the user determines the sequence
and organization of the structure of the program. The courts have been less
than precise in distinguishing the manner in which a program is structured by
its designer from the structure of that program as encountered by the user.
See the discussion of Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127
(N.D. Cal. 1986), infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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program and its screen displays in cases raising the issue of
video game display copyright. Consistently holding that a game
screen and the computer program that generates it are sepa-
rately copyrightable,5 9 these courts have found that displays
have original authorship independent of the program60 as well
as the requisite fixation for copyrightability.6 Moreover, one
court has held that a copyright only in a screen display also
protects the underlying program which generates it. 62 That
court reasoned that the program was a protected "copy" of the
video game display.6
3
59. Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg.
v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Courts are in unanimous agreement that the video displays are copyright-
able as audiovisual works. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436
(4th Cir. 1986); Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 615 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman,
669 F.2d at 856; Atari v. Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md.
1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 479 (D. Neb. 1981).
60. Originality of video game screen displays has been challenged on two
grounds: the original content is contained in the program, not the display, and
the game screens are too much the product of the individual player's interac-
tive input to be original to the copyright holder. Courts have consistently re-
jected these arguments, finding sufficient independent authorship in both
program and screen to copyright each as an original work and finding copy-
rightable display constants in video game screens that do not vary from user to
user. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., 669 F.2d at 856.
61. Because screen displays are contained in the program code and can be
generated from the program with the aid of the computer, screens meet the
statutory requirements for fixation. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 441-42; see supra
notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
62. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442.
63. The Kramer court concluded,
[W]e hold that a copyright in the audiovisual display, which display is
created by a computer program, protects not only the audiovisual
from copying, but also the underlying computer program to the ex-
tent the program embodies the game's expression. The program, as
we have noted, is, by definition a "copy" under the Act, and the Act
grants to the copyright holder the exclusive right to reproduce copies
or derivatives of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
Id, at 442.
The reasoning in Kramer is based on the Copyright Act's definition of
copy:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
"copies" includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Because the display is "fixed" in the program and can
be reproduced from it, the program may be considered a copy of the display.
Kramer, 783 F.2d at 441.
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The video game cases have generally given broad copyright
protection to the video displays of game programs. Even when
a defendant's game varied significantly in detail from the plain-
tiff's, courts have found infringement if the games taken as a
whole shared a similar "total concept and feel." This kind of
broad standard of protection is appropriate to works that are
highly creative visually and in which a broad range of expres-
sion is possible.65
2. Nongame Screen Displays
Nongame program screens have traditionally been less
visually spectacular than their video game counterparts. De-
signers invest much creative energy toward making the user in-
terface of even the most complex programs simple and
unobtrusive.66 As a result the copyright issue is more difficult.
The two courts that have considered the copyrightability of
nongame screen displays have disagreed sharply over the
method of copyright analysis and the extent of copyright
protection.
The first court granted screen displays very broad protec-
tion. In Broderbund Software v. Unison World,67 Broderbund
had copyrighted a program 68 compatible with Apple computers
called Print Shop, designed to create greeting cards, signs, pos-
ters, and banners.69 When Unison World marketed an IBM-
compatible program called Printmaster, which had screen dis-
64. See, e.g., Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 614, 618 (7th Cir.) (finding many aspects of PAC-MAN to be unprotected
scenes a faire, see supra note 20, but holding that defendant's portrayal of cen-
tral figure as "gobbler" and pursuing figures as "ghost monsters" was violation
of plaintiff's copyrighted expression), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); cq.
Atari v. Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. 222, 229-30 (D. Md. 1981) ("Meteors"
game did not violate plaintiff's copyright in "Asteroids" because similarity be-
tween games was due to shared idea of combating cascading space rocks and
hostile space ships).
65. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (McDonaldland commercials captured "total
concept and feel" of H.R. Pufnstuf show); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (greeting cards showed "total concept
and feel" similarity in that they had similar characters portraying similar
moods, with similar messages, with similar arrangement of text and graphics).
66. See B. SHNEIDERMAN, DESIGNING THE USER INTERFAcE: STRATEGIES
FOR EFFECTvE HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACrION 3, 8-9 (1987).
67. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
68. Broderbund also obtained a separate copyright on the screen display
of Print Shop as an audiovisual work. See infra note 97.
69. 648 F. Supp. at 1130. The company sold 500,000 copies between intro-
duction of the program in 1984 and commencement of the suit. Id.
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plays similar to Broderbund's, Broderbund sued for copyright
infringement.70  Because the federal district court in
Broderbund discussed the screens and the underlying program
as a unit, the court's opinion has generally been construed as
holding that a copyright of a program also protects the screen
displays generated by it.71
The court rejected Unison World's contention that the
screens contained insufficient expression to qualify for copy-
right protection.72 Like the Whelan court,73 the Broderbund
court identified the unprotected idea in terms of the function of
the program-the creation of greeting cards, banners, posters,
and signs.74 The Broderbund court reasoned that because the
particular structure, sequence, and arrangement of screens cho-
sen by Broderbund was not the only means by which to struc-
ture the screens of a printing program, that structure was not
necessary to the program's function and was therefore copy-
rightable expression.75
In a subsequent case, however, another district court de-
70. The facts of Broderbund can be sketched as follows. Unsuccessful in
its own attempts to create an IBM-compatible version of Print Shop,
Broderbund entered into discussions with the defendant Unison World about
creating such a version. Id After Unison World had spent more than a month
working on the project, the venture was terminated when Unison World pro-
tested that Broderbund's advances against royalties were insufficient. Id at
1130-31. Unison World then abandoned its plan to create a facsimile of Print
Shop for BM computers and set out to create its own enhanced version. The
menu screens and 10 other screens, finished under the project to duplicate
Print Shop, were retained in the new version. Id. at 1131. Unison World rede-
signed other screens, added a calendar function, streamlined the method by
which the user could select designs, and added a feature enabling designs to be
retained in memory. Id- Unison World began marketing its Printmaster in
March 1985, and Broderbund sued for copyright infringement. Id
71. The court concluded, "Whelan thus stands for the proposition that
copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer pro-
gram, but rather that it extends to the overall structure of a program, includ-
ing its audiovisual displays." Id- at 1133 (discussing Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877
(1987)). The uncertainty as to what Broderbund actually holds is discussed in-
fra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
72. 648 F. Supp. at 1132. Specific doctrines to which Unison World ap-
pealed were that the idea and expression were so intertwined as to constitute
merger;, the screen was a useful article beyond the ambit of protection; and the
screens were analogous to rules and instructions which are given very limited
protection. Id at 1133-34.
73. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
74. 648 F. Supp. at 1133.
75. Id. at 1132-33. In finding infringement of the structure, sequence, and
arrangement of Broderbund's screens, the court applied the "total concept and
feel" standard. Id. at 1137. This standard is discussed supra notes 64-65.
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parted considerably from Broderbund's analysis. The plaintiff
in Digital Communications Associates v. Softklone Distributing
Corp.76 had created a status screen for a communications pro-
gram known as Crosstalk XVI.77 The status screen enabled the
user to select among numerous listed commands by typing the
first two letters of the desired command. The initial letters of
each command on the screen were highlighted and capital-
ized.78 Pursuant to Copyright Office procedure at that time,79
the plaintiff registered two copyrights, one in the program that
generated the status screen and one in the status screen itself.
The plaintiff alleged its copyright in Crosstalk was infringed by
a communications program called Mirror which utilized a simi-
lar status screen. 0
Considering first the copyright registration of the program,
the Softklone court refused to find that Softklone's screen in-
fringed Digital's copyright in the underlying computer pro-
gram. In doing so, the Softklone court sharply rejected
Broderbund's holding-as the Softklone court interpreted that
case-that a program's copyright protects its screens.8 1  The
Softklone court reasoned that a screen display cannot be consid-
ered a copy of the underlying program because various pro-
grams could produce the same screen display.8 2  Thus,
according to the court, the replication of a screen cannot in-
fringe the copyright in the program.8 3
76. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
77. Id. at 452.
78. The screens at issue are reproduced in the opinion. See id. at 465-66.
79. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
80. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 453. The defendant had developed Mirror
with advice from counsel that the Crosstalk program was copyright protected
but not its screens. Id
81. The court concluded, "[A] computer program's copyright protection
does not extend to the program's screen displays and the copying of a pro-
gram's screen displays, without evidence of copying of the program's source
code, object code, sequence, organization or structure, does not state a claim of
infringement." Id at 456.
82. Id.
83. Acknowledging the reasoning of the video game cases that held that a
program was a protected copy of a copyrighted screen display, the Softklone
court rejected the converse implication that screens are a protected copy of
their underlying programs:
The distinction between programs and screen displays lies in the fact
that if one has a fixed computer program, one can, with the aid of a
computer, repeatedly produce the same screen display. Thus, a com-
puter program is a copy of a screen display. The converse, however, is
not true. If one has a fixed screen display, one cannot, even with the
aid of a machine, repeatedly create the same program (source or ob-
ject code) as many different programs can create the same screen dis-
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Although the copyright in the underlying program failed to
protect the screen, the Softlone court nevertheless upheld
Digital's infringement claim on the strength of Digital's sepa-
rate copyright registration of the status screen itself.8 Even
while granting protection for the screen, however, the Soft-
kone court differed with Broderbund's analysis and scope of
protection. Like the Broderbund court, the court in Softlione
rejected the defendant's argument that the screen contained in-
sufficient expression to warrant protection. 5 The court deter-
mined that the status screen was sufficiently creative and
informative to avoid classification as an uncopyrightable blank
form.86 Unlike the Broderbund court, however, the Softklone
court defined the unprotected idea as the manner in which the
status screen operates rather than as the function of the pro-
gram or screen.8 7 The court therefore regarded as ideas the
concept of a status screen, a command driven program, and the
typing of two symbols to activate a command.88 The expression
of these ideas, in the court's view, was the means chosen to
communicate the screen's manner of operation, including the
arrangement of command terms on the screen and the high-
lighting and capitalization of the initial two letters of each com-
mand. As copyrightable expression, these could not be
play. Thus, a computer screen display is not a "copy" of any
particular computer program and copyright protection of the com-
puter program will not extend to a screen display such as the plain-
tiff's status screen.
Id.
84. Id The status screen was registered as a derivative work of the un-
derlying source code and as a compilation of program terms. The court re-
jected the plaintiff's contention that the program merited copyright protection
as a derivative work but did extend protection to it as a compilation. Id at 463.
The copyright statute defines a compilation as follows:
A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assem-
bling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated,
or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole consti-
tutes an original work of authorship. The term "compilation" in-
cludes collective works.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The court also classified the screen as a literary work.
Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 462. The court reasoned that the status screen can-
not be an audiovisual work because no sequence of images or screens is in-
volved. Although it expressed some uncertainty, the court concluded that a
work that would be a literary work if written on paper does not change its
character simply because it is displayed on a screen. Id. See supra note 7 for
the statutory definitions of literary and audiovisual works.
85. Sofiklone, 659 F. Supp. at 457, 460.
86. Id at 460-62.
87. Id. at 458.
88. Id. at 458-59.
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appropriated by Softklone.8 9
3. Copyright Office Procedure Concerning Screen
Display Copyright
The already confusing case law is aggravated by the pres-
ent position of the Copyright Office on registering screen dis-
plays. The general policy of the Copyright Office is to allow
only one registration for any one work.90 Under this policy a
registration of a computer program would be deemed to cover
all copyrightable subject matter contained in that program, in-
cluding the screens generated by it. Prior to the Broderbund
decision, however, the Copyright Office allowed applicants to
subdivide some programs into separately registrable units so
long as each unit contained separately copyrightable subject
matter.91 With video games, for example, the Office had al-
lowed registrants to secure one copyright in the computer pro-
gram and another separate audiovisual copyright in the game
displays.92 The Office had also allowed separate registration of
programs and screens for nongame application programs. For
example, the plaintiffs in both Broderbund and Softklone had
obtained separate copyright registrations for the programs and
screens.93 After the Broderbund decision, however, the Office
reversed its policy of accepting separate registrations of screens
and programs for screens consisting primarily of text rather
than graphics, insisting that textual screens are protected by
the program's registration.94 This most recent Copyright Office
89. Id.
90. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(6) (1987).
91. Peters, Current Developments Concerning the Registration of Com-
puter Programs and Data Bases, 1986 COMPUTER LAW INST. 945, 957.
92. Id.; Reback & Hayes, supra note 40, at 1, 2.
93. See infra note 97; supra note 84.
94. See Letter from the Copyright Office (Jan. 20, 1987), reprinted in 33
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 825, at 613-14 (April 9, 1987) [here-
inafter Letter]. Recently Lotus Development Corp., cognizant of the holding
in Softklone that a program's copyright does not extend to its screen displays,
attempted to register its Lotus 1-2-3 displays separately. This was apparently
in preparation for its pending infringement suit against Paperback Software
International and Mosaic Software. 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
No. 825, at 613 (April 9, 1987). The Copyright Office refused the application on
the grounds that Lotus's registration of its program protected its screen dis-
plays, putting Lotus in a catch-22 situation. The Copyright Office responded-
It is the position of the Copyright Office that textual screen dis-
plays embodied within the computer program that generates them are
covered by the registration for the programs, without either the need
or justification for separate registration for the displays. Because the
displays are considered to be an integral part of the program, the au-
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position contradicts the holding of Softklone that a program's
copyright does not protect its screen display. By disallowing re-
gistration of screen displays, the Copyright Office places devel-
opers desiring to protect their screens at the mercy of courts
that might follow the Softklone precedent.
II. EXAMINING BRODERBUND AND SOFTKLONE:
CONFLICTING APPROACHES AND TOO
MUCH PROTECTION
Copyright protection of computer display screens initially
presents the issue of whether a copyright in the computer pro-
gram also protects the display screens generated by it. In addi-
tion, courts must decide how broad the scope of copyright
protection of screens should be, regardless of whether the
screens are independently copyrighted or protected by the un-
derlying program. The following analysis assesses how success-
fully the Broderbund and Softklone courts have resolved these
issues.
A. THE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SCREEN DISPLAYS
THROUGH THE COPYRIGHT OF THE UNDERLYING
PROGRAM
The Broderbund court did not directly address the relation-
ship between a copyright in a computer program and protection
of its screen display. The opinion treated the program and its
screens as an inseparable unit, looking to the function of the
program and computer program case precedent to define the
scope of copyright protection for the screen display before the
court.95 This unified approach to program and screens led the
thorship in the displays appears to be the same as that contained in
the program. Moreover, the Copyright Office would not register a
claim in the format or layout.
Letter, supra.
On account of the confusion over the protection of screen displays, the
Copyright Office scheduled hearings to review its position on the issue. The
hearings were held on September 9, 1987. A summary of the testimony given
at the hearing can be found in 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No.
847, at 507-09 (Sept. 17, 1987).
95. The court structured the plaintiff's claim in terms of program copy-
right infringement. For example, the court opened its statement of facts as
follows: "Plaintiffs ... are the exclusive licensee and the copyright holder, re-
spectively, of a computer software printing program called 'The Print
Shop' . . . . Plaintiffs claim that the overall appearance, structure, and se-
quence of the audiovisual displays in 'Printmaster' infringe plaintiffs' copy-
right on 'Print Shop."' Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1129-30. The court's
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Soft klone court, the sole judicial interpretation of the
Broderbund opinion to date, to understand Broderbund to hold
that a computer program's copyright also protects the screen
display it generates.96 It is not clear, however, that this issue
was before the Broderbund court because that court was con-
sidering an infringement claim arising under a separate copy-
right in the screen display as an audiovisual work rather than a
copyright in the program.9 7 It is not surprising, then, that
Broderbund has been read to stand for quite differing
propositions. 98
To the extent the Broderbund opinion implied that a pro-
gram's copyright extends protection to its screen display, it did
so through a misplaced reliance on Whelan Associates v. Jaslow
idea-expression analysis focused on the entire program, not just the screen
displays. Id. at 1132. Furthermore, the cases the court looked to for control-
ling precedent are program infringement cases, not audiovisual infringement
cases. Id. at 1132-33. Finally, it is clear from its discussion of whether the
plaintiff provided adequate notice of its copyright claim in its screens that the
court regarded the screens as a part of the program. The court stated:
The only copyright notice in "Print Shop" appears on the initial, or
"boot up," screen. That notice generally states that Pixellite Software
claims copyright protection over "Print Shop"; it does not specify the
particular aspects of the program over which protection is claimed.
The Court finds that plaintiffs' display of the copyright notice
provided defendant with reasonable warning that the audiovisual dis-
plays in "Print Shop" were copyrighted.
Id. at 1135.
96. See infra note 98.
97. Although the opinion makes no explicit mention of this fact, the
plaintiff had apparently secured a separate copyright in the screen displays as
an audiovisual work. Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Statement, reprinted in 1986 Com-
puter Indus. Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publ.) 4046, 4049. Further, the opening lan-
guage of the opinion defined the action as one for audiovisual copyright
infringement. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1129. In addition, although it cites
no audiovisual copyright cases, the court at least purports to be applying audio-
visual copyright law. The court, for example, concludes its summary of facts
with the transition, "It is to these facts that the Court now applies the law ap-
plicable to audiovisual copyrights." Id. at 1131.
98. Softklone clearly understood Broderbund to hold that a program's
copyright protects its screens. The court commented that Broderbund con-
cluded a computer program's copyright protection "extends to ... its audiovi-
sual displays." 659 F. Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987); see also Pearson, The Last
Days of the Clones? Protecting the "Look and Feel" of Software, SoFrWARE
PROTECTION, June 1987, at 2, 3 (reading Broderbund as holding that program's
copyright protection extends to screens). Other commentators have read
Broderbund as a screen infringement case that has no bearing on the issue of
whether a program's copyright protects its screens. See Davidson, Common
Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1037, 1101 n.157 (1986); Com-
ment, Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.: "Look and Feel"
Copyright Protection for the Display Screens of an Application Microcom-
puter Program, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 105, 105 (1987).
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Dental Laboratory.9 In Whelan the court extended the scope
of copyright protection in a computer program to its structure,
sequence, and organization.10° The Broderbund court drew
from Vhelan the conclusion that screens are within this pro-
tected structure, sequence, and organization of the program, °0 '
but it did so by apparently misreading the context in which the
Whelan court discussed screen displays. Although the Whelan
court briefly discussed the similarity of screen displays as possi-
bly relevant evidence of similarity of the underlying program
code, it dismissed the screens as only minimally relevant to the
program infringement claim because entirely different program
codes can produce similar screens. 10 2 The court in Whelan
never suggested the program's copyright extended beyond the
program code to embrace its screen display. Despite the
Broderbund court's professed reliance on Whelan, therefore, its
extension of a program's copyright to the structure, sequence,
and organization of its screens is without precedent.
In contrast, the Softklone court directly addressed the rela-
tionship between program copyright and screen protection and
held that a copyright only in a program does not protect the
screens generated by that program. 0 3 The Softklone court rea-
soned that because different programs can produce the same
display, screens cannot be considered copies of the underlying
program and therefore are not protected by that program's
copyright.'0 4 Although this reasoning has force, it does not ad-
dress the working assumption of Broderbund and the Copy-
right Office that screens are protected by the program's
copyright, not because they are a copy of the program, but sim-
99. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
100. See supra text accompanying note 53.
101. 648 F. Supp. at 1133. For the Broderbund court's interpretation of
Whelan, see supra note 71.
102. The Whelan court commented:
Insofar as everything that a computer does, including its screen
outputs, is related to the program that operates it, there is necessarily
a causal relationship between the program and the screen outputs.
The screen outputs must bear some relation to the underlying pro-
grams, and therefore they have some probative value. The evidence
about the screen outputs therefore passes the low admissibility
threshold of Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244.
The author of the unanimous opinion, Judge Becker, explained that an-
other member of the panel, Judge Rosenn, believed that screens had no proba-
tive value as evidence of copying of the underlying program. Id. at 1244 n.45.
103. See supra note 81.
104. See supra note 83.
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ply because they are contained within the program's code and
are therefore a part of the program.10 5 The Softklone court
overlooked compelling arguments for rejecting the unitary
treatment of screens and programs that derive from the in-
dependent authorship and distinct purposes of screens and
programs.10 6
B. THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SCREENS
Although both the Broderbund and Softklone courts
granted screen displays some protection, they differed mark-
edly in the method by which they defined the proper scope of
that protection.
The Broderbund opinion contains several significant meth-
odological flaws which render it poor precedent. Initially, the
court incorrectly identified the object of its idea-expression in-
quiry. The court looked to the function of the program to de-
fine what constitutes idea in the screens.10 7 Because screens are
a different genre of communication than programs, addressing
the user rather than directing the operations of the com-
puter, 08 screens and programs are unlikely to share the same
idea. Unless courts confine their idea-expression analysis in
screen infringement cases to the screens alone, they will be un-
able to develop a consistent scope of protection that addresses
the special requirements of screens.'0 9
Moreover, the Broderbund court's function test for distin-
guishing idea from expression is overly broad. In granting pro-
tection to everything unnecessary to a program's function, the
test allows an initial developer to copyright a particular ap-
proach to a task and monopolize that approach. The function
test therefore threatens the availability of standardized ap-
proaches to similar tasks 10 and provides no check against ex-
tending protection to simple formats and conventions."'
105. See supra notes 71, 94.
106. See infra note 128; text accompanying notes 128-29.
107. See supra text accompanying note 74.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 128-29.
109. I&
110. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
111. For example, the Broderbund court, apparently applying a useful arti-
cles analysis to screens it had classified as an audiovisual work, extended copy-
right protection to simple phrases such as "choose a font." The court
reasoned:
In the present case, it is clear that the structure, sequence, and
layout of the audiovisual displays in "Print Shop" were dictated pri-
marily by artistic and aesthetic considerations, and not by utilitarian
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Not only is the function test too broad, it is also unwork-
ably vague. The test informs developers only that the function
of a program or screen is unprotected idea. In leaving every as-
pect of a work except its function as potential expression, the
test gives developers no guidance as to how similar two works
that share the same function may be without risking copyright
infringement. This uncertainty as to what degree of similarity
might be actionable forces a prudent developer of a program
that performs the same tasks as existing programs to create a
work totally dissimilar to its predecessors. Moreover, the term
function is too nondescript to give developers meaningful gui-
dance. Like idea, function can be defined at various levels of
abstraction.m Therefore, describing a screen display's idea as
its function is no more helpful to defining the parameters of a
screen's unprotected material than is the truism that a screen's
idea is its idea.
In addition, in ruling that the sequence, structure, and or-
ganization of Print Shop's screens was copyrightable expres-
sion,113 the Broderbund court both ignored precedent contrary
to its holding, such as Synercom,11 4 and never explained why
the particular sequence, structure, and organization of Print
or mechanical ones. Repeatedly, the testimony of David Balsam
showed that, in creating the screens of "Print Shop," he based textual
and graphic decisions on the basis of aesthetic and artistic preferences.
On the "Now Type Your Message" screen of "Print Shop," for in-
stance, no mechanical or practical constraint forced Balsam to make
the "Stencil" typeface smaller on the display than the "Alexia" type-
face. The choice was purely arbitrary. On the "Choose a Font"
screen, no mechanical or practical factor compelled Balsam to use
those exact words ("Choose a Font"). He could have written, "Select
a Font," or "Indicate a Typeface Preference," or "Which Type Style
Do You Prefer," or any combination of these terms.
648 F. Supp. at 1134. See supra note 30 for a description of the statutory useful
articles analysis, which is limited to aesthetic features of pictorial, sculptural,
or graphic works.
112. For example, the function (unprotected idea) of a word processing
program's screen could be described at the following levels of abstraction, each
yielding a different range of copyrightable expression: (1) a screen which en-
ables the user to view and select commands, (2) a screen which enables the
user to view and select word processing commands, (3) a screen which enables
the user to view and select spacing, tabulation, margin, page length, and type
font commands, (4) a screen which enables the user to view and select spacing,
tabulation, margin, page length, and type font commands by typing the first
two letters of the displayed command.
113. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133.
114. For discussion of Synercom, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Other contrary precedent ignored by Broderbund includes Plains Cotton Coop.
v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 108 S. Ct.
80 (1987), discussed supra note 58.
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Shop's screens should be considered expression rather than
idea.115 The court failed to consider whether the structure and
sequencing of screens for a printing program might be dictated
substantially by the program's purpose and therefore be part of
its idea.116
The Softklone court's method of analysis greatly improved
on that of Broderbund. Unlike Broderbund, the court limited
the scope of its idea-expression inquiry to the screen itself. 7
Furthermore, the court in Softklone refused to adopt the ex-
pansive and vague function of the work standard used in
Broderbund118 and Whelan' 19 for distinguishing idea from ex-
pression. Instead, the court distinguished the manner of opera-
tion (idea) from the communication of that operation
(expression). 20 Thus, the aspects of the status screen that com-
municate the manner in which the screen operates constitute
copyrightable expression.' 12 For example, under the Softkione
approach, the typing of two letters to effectuate a displayed
command is an unprotected idea because it relates to the
screen's operation. In contrast, the capitalization of the initial
two letters of each command on the status screen is protected
expression because it communicates the screen's operation to
the user.
The Softklone manner-communication distinction gives a
more circumscribed scope of protection than does the
Broderbund function test because it narrows the realm of copy-
rightable expression. Under the function test, the unprotect-
able idea of the screen in Softklone would have been its
115. The court reasoned that the existence of a children's program called
"Stickybear Printer," which also created signs, posters, and banners, proved
that the idea was capable of more than one expression and thus plaintiff's ex-
pression was copyrightable. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133. The analogy to
Stickybear Printer further demonstrates that Broderbund's definition of idea
is overly broad, see supra text accompanying notes 110-12. Stickybear Printer
is a children's program and can therefore share the same idea as the sophisti-
cated Print Shop only if idea is defined in remarkably broad functional terms.
See Comment, supra note 98, at 127.
116. See the discussion of Plains Cotton, supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
117. The court commented, "Since the work at issue is the status screen,
the court must determine what is the 'idea' behind the status screen and then
determine whether the expression of the status screen is 'necessary' to that
idea." Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 458.
118. See supra text accompanying note 74.
119. See supra note 54.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
121. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 459.
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function: enabling the user to select among various communi-
cation program commands. The screen's protectable expression
would have been any feature of the screen not essential to this
function.12 2 As a result, under the function test, the technique
of typing the first two letters to initiate the displayed command
would be protectable expression, contrary to Softklone's hold-
ing, because the two-letter method is not the only means of se-
lecting commands and is therefore not essential to the
program's function. The Softklone court's definition of idea al-
lows competing programs to use similar techniques, such as the
two-letter method of selecting an operation, as long as the
screen displays do not communicate these operations to the
user in exactly the same language or style. This approach de-
nies one developer an extended monopoly on the most efficient
methods of operation for a given task while protecting its
choice of symbols and style of presentation.
The Softklone court, however, improperly rejected defend-
ant's claim that the idea and the expression had merged in the
status screen.1 23 If typing the first two letters of a command to
effect that command is an idea, and if capitalizing those two let-
ters is expression, merger problems arise because relatively few
means exist whereby those first two letters can be emphasized.
They may be capitalized, highlighted, bracketed, or underlined,
but the range of viable options is limited.'2 Granting copyright
in those particular expressions will allow the idea to be monop-
olized once those few variations are appropriated. The Soft-
klone court was prepared to apply the merger doctrine only
when the idea is capable of one form of expression.'2 A re-
fusal by courts to apply the merger doctrine in situations in-
volving more than one, but still limited means of expression,
1 2 6
however, will force the development of new methods of in-
terfacing for every competing program, resulting in needless
complexity for designers and users alike.m2
Thus, the obtuse analysis of the Broderbund court occa-
122. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987), discussed supra text accompany-
ing note 54; see also Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132-33, discussed supra text
accompanying note 75.
123. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing merger
doctrine).
124. Softklone, 659 F. Supp. at 460.
125. Id at 457-58.
126. See supra note 20.
127. See infra note 141.
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sioned by its failure to distinguish screen and program, coupled
with Softklone's weak rationale for requiring independent
copyright protection for screens, leaves the copyright relation-
ship between program and screen unresolved. At the same
time, although the Softklone court provided an analysis which
greatly improved on that of the Broderbund court, both deci-
sions overprotect screens.
III. CORRECTING BRODERBUND AND SOFTKLONE:
THE APPROPRIATE PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER SCREENS
Software developers who seek to ensure copyright protec-
tion for screen displays in which they have invested considera-
ble time and creative energy will only be confused by the
current legal climate. Maintaining that a registration of the
computer program alone is sufficient to protect textual screens,
the Copyright Office refuses to register screen displays of most
nongame programs. Conflicting with this position, the most re-
cent computer screen copyright case, Digital Communications
Associates v. Softklone Distributing Corp.,us held that a copy-
right in a program alone does not protect the screens generated
by it. In a jurisdiction following the Softklone precedent, there-
fore, a developer who is unable to register its screens separately
has no legal recourse against a competitor who appropriates the
developer's screen display but uses a different computer pro-
gram to produce it. Furthermore, there is as yet too little judi-
cial guidance as to the proper scope of copyright protection for
screen displays. Without clear guidance as to what constitutes
unprotected idea as opposed to protected expression, developers
will not be able to predict the risks of their program develop-
ment decisions. The following proposals delineate how these is-
sues should be resolved.
A. SCREENS AND PROGRAMS SHOULD BE TREATED
INDEPENDENTLY FOR COPYRIGHT PURPOSES
For copyright purposes, the courts and the Copyright Of-
fice should consider separately screens and the programs that
generate them. Developers with a substantial investment in
the creation of their screen displays should be allowed to regis-
ter separate copyright claims on those screens, and courts
128. 659 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ga. 1987), discussed supra notes 76-89, 103-06,
117-27 and accompanying text.
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should require plaintiffs seeking to enforce copyright claims
pertaining to screens to obtain such registration.
Separate copyright treatment of screens and programs ac-
knowledges that they are independently authored. Because de-
signing screens that are attractive, efficient, and easy to use and
that minimize visual fatigue involves multiple disciplines,
screens of sophisticated programs are often designed by teams
of professionals that may include engineers, psychologists,
graphic artists, and ergonomists.m The particular program
code, in contrast, is authored by a programmer who implements
the visual package authored by the designers of the screen dis-
play. Independent copyright treatment of screens respects
their independent authorship and the substantial creative in-
vestment that goes into their design.
Moreover, screens and programs deserve independent
treatment because they are functionally distinct. A program is
designed to direct a computer to accomplish a particular task as
efficiently as possible. A screen, however, is designed to com-
municate with the user. Because of this functional difference,
programs and screens communicate in entirely different lan-
guages: programs are written in computer code which instructs
the machine, whereas screens are written in language and sym-
bols that communicate with the user. Separate registration will
also encourage courts, when faced with a screen infringement
case, to focus on the scope of copyright protection appropriate
to screens when undertaking their idea-expression analysis.
Otherwise, a court is likely to confuse the screen's idea with the
substantially different idea of the underlying program, as did
the Broderbund court.130
Finally, separate copyright registration insures protection
for screens under the Copyright Act. A registration of a com-
129. Two commentators have observed-
The creative authorship in a program's audiovisual components is
altogether separate from the creative authorship in a program's code.
The most fanciful and widely recognized personal computer screen
displays were designed by teams of graphic artists, psychologists, and
ergonometric engineers. Programmers then implemented these screen
designs in computer code. The programmers exhibited creative ex-
pression and original authorship in their choice of code, but that origi-
nality and creativity was separate and distinct from the artistic
creativity in the design of the visual display itself.
Reback & Hayes, supra note 40, at 8; see also B. SHNEMERMAN, supra note 66,
at 391 (screen design will come to involve collaboration among specialists in
specific aspects of screen design and consultation with artists, writers, sociolo-
gists, and psychologists).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
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puter program alone arguably protects only the computer code
that generates the screens because a program is defined in the
Copyright Act as a set of instructions which is used by a com-
puter.1 31 A copyright in a program alone, therefore, offers no
statutory protection against appropriation of screens as long as
the competing program used a different code to generate them.
Requiring separate registration for screens and programs
would not unduly burden developers or the Copyright Office. 13 2
The Office has always accepted separate registration of com-
puter programs and screen displays for video games without ad-
ministrative difficulty.133 Furthermore, until recently, the
Office accepted separate registration of programs and screens
for nongame application programs. It did not cite administra-
tive concerns as the reason for its change in policy.L34 Develop-
ers seeking protection for screen displays could deposit
individual reproductions of the screens that have copyrightable
content, or in the case of nonstatic screens such as video game
screens, developers could follow the video game precedent and
deposit a video tape of the entire screen display sequence.1as
B. COURTS SHOULD GRANT DISPLAY SCREENS ONLY LIMITED
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Screens generated by application programs need some mea-
sure of copyright protection. The user interface is a valuable
asset of a program because ease of use and efficiency of opera-
tion are major concerns of potential purchasers. 3 6 As a result,
the design of screens is typically the subject of substantial in-
vestment of creative energy and resources. Some protection is
131. See supra note 44.
132. One commentator has argued for single-unit registration covering
both program and screen display, citing administrative difficulties of dual re-
gistration. Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer
Software, 38 STAN L. REV. 497, 530-32 (1986). The small administrative bur-
den of dual registration, however, is not nearly as problematic as the commin-
gling of programs and screens for the purposes of copyright analysis.
133. Reback & Hayes, supra note 40, at 1.
134. See supra note 94.
135. Existing copyright regulations provide for the deposit of works fixed
or published only in machine-readable form by depositing "identifying mate-
rial" that "best represents the copyrightable content of the work." 37 C.F.R. §
202.20(c)(2)(viii) (1987). Machine-readable audiovisual works can be deposited
in the form of a videotape or a series of photographs depicting the work. Id.
§ 202.20(c)(2)(viii)(B). Similar provisions provide for a workable deposit of
machine-readable literary and pictorial or graphic works. Id. §
202.20(c) (2) (viii) (A).
136. See B. SHNEIDERMAN, supra note 66, at v, 16-18.
1152 [Vol. 72:1123
COMPUTER SCREEN COPYRIGHT
necessary to encourage innovation and development of effi-
cient, aesthetically appealing, and "user-friendly" screen
displays.137
Equally persuasive considerations require, however, that
such protection be very limited in scope. Technological ad-
vancement in areas such as computer program development is
an incremental process of building on existing technology.138
Granting expansive copyright protection to a technology such
as screen design risks giving the developer a virtual monopoly
over a process or system for performing a given task.139 Such a
monopoly would prevent another developer from improving the
versatility or efficiency of a user interface or adapting that in-
terface for use on other computer systems for which it is not
currently available. Furthermore, the duration of copyright
protection-potentially up to seventy-five years' 40-creates a
disincentive for the owner to speed innovation and adaptation.
Broad copyright protection for screens, therefore, has a tremen-
dous potential for chilling innovative activity, especially given
the severe remedies available against an infringing
developer.14 1
A restricted scope of copyright protection for screens is
137. Reback & Hayes, supra note 40, at 10.
138. Professors Krauthaus and Nimmer comment:
Protection of a copyright claim should be structured to reduce its po-
tential to distort future work on the same subject. Elements of a work
may be construed as idea content of the program or unprotectable, ge-
neric methods if protecting them would significantly distort future
work. In this regard, limiting copyright protection so as to permit un-
knowing, independent development alone is inadequate. Absent pat-
ent protection, subsequent technology developers have a right to use
aspects of new techniques and ideas central to their science. Espe-
cially in a technical field, the risk of copyright liability creates a chil-
ling effect, inducing developers to avoid examining earlier work.
Subsequent workers need not operate in ignorance of the work of
others, and copyright should be structured not to induce them to do
so. New technology develops with knowledge of prior work.
Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 6, at 37-38; see also Note, Copyright In-
fringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Simi-
larity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1291-92 (1984) (advocating very limited
"iterative" protection for computer programs because progress in the industry
is typically a step-by-step process which builds upon the work of others).
139. See Davidson, supra note 98, at 1100-04.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982) (copyright duration of a work for hire).
141. See Pearson, supra note 98, at 4. Dan Bricklin, developer of VisiCalc,
commented that he may have been "scared off" from developing VisiCalc had
the current copyright climate existed then. Churbuck & Kanzler, Last Year's
Litigation Sets Scene for Round Two in Software Law Battle, PC WEEK, Jan.
20, 1987, at 130.
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also necessary to insure adequate standardization of user inter-
faces.' 42 Should each developer have to design a unique user
interface, use of computers will become needlessly complex, se-
riously impairing the very productivity that computers are
designed to enhance. By imagining an auto industry in which
each manufacturer had to design unique instrumentation,
unique placement of pedals, turn signals, and shift levers, and
unique gear shift patterns, one can appreciate the potential con-
sequences to the computer user should overly broad copyright
protection frustrate standardization of user interfaces. Courts
should give software developers sufficient latitude to develop
standard customs and conventions such as common command
terms, common methods of effecting commands, and basic lay-
out of screens. Broad protection militates against such
standardization.
One method by which courts can narrowly circumscribe
copyright protection for screen displays is to heighten the low
threshold of originality or creativity required for copyright pro-
tection.143 Traditionally, the requisite originality for copyright
protection has been minimal, requiring only that a work be the
product of the author's independent labors and demanding lit-
tle creative content.1 " A heightened originality standard
would grant protection only to screens that represent an identi-
fiable advancement in the art or technology of screen design.
As a point of departure, courts could look to the originality
standard written into the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984.145 The Act's exclusion of "staple, commonplace, or fa-
142. See Brief of Amici Curiae at 10-11, Digital Communications Assocs. v.
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (No. C86-128A), re-
printed in 1987 Computer Indus. Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publ.) 5344, 5349-50;
Churbuck & Freedman, Suits Against 1-2-3 Imitators May Have Wide User
Impact, PC WEEK, Jan. 20, 1987, at 1, 6. One concern expressed is the tremen-
dous cost of training personnel in any changeover from one system to another
if user interfaces are not somewhat standard. This changeover cost may lock a
company into a particular program. The potential impact of forced non-
standardization on businesses can be appreciated by comparing the problems
that might be generated if a typewriter company secured a copyright on the
arrangement of keys on the standard keyboard. The cost of retraining person-
nel for different systems would be enormous, and employee mobility would be
substantially impaired.
143. See Amici Curiae Brief, Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (No. C85-3457 WHO), reprinted in Davis, Special
Problems in "Look and Feel" Copyright Cases, 1986 COMPUTER L. INsT. 741,
775-76.
144. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
145. Act of Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 301, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. 1987)).
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miliar"'146 designs represents a small movement away from the
minimal copyright originality standard toward the more de-
manding novelty standard of patent law. 47
The unique history of software development justifies this
unconventional raising of the standard of originality. Software
engineering developed at a very rapid pace in a relatively un-
regulated entrepreneurial market in which developers sought
competitive advantage through rapid innovation rather than
through copyright protection of past developments. 48 Develop-
ers customarily adapted and improved on the work of others. 49
Court incorporation of a heightened originality requirement
would simply recognize the industry's shared development and
use of basic screen designs. Absent a heightened originality re-
quirement, however, a developer could copyright a screen dis-
play that adopts formats, techniques, or designs commonly used
in the industry and, should some court deem them expression,
secure a long-lasting monopoly thereon.
The second, and most fundamental, method by which the
courts can limit the scope of copyright protection for screen dis-
plays is through carefully defining what constitutes idea and
expression in screens. 50 The demarcation of uncopyrightable
146. The Act denies protection to a work that "(1) is not original; or
(2) consists of designs that are staple, commonplace, or familiar in the semi-
conductor industry, or variations of such designs, combined in a way that, con-
sidered as a whole, is not original." 17 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis
added).
147. See R. STERN, SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECION § 5.3, at 169-70
(1986).
148. Pearson, supra note 98, at 2.
149. For example, Lotus Development Corp., which is suing two small
software firms for copyright infringement of Lotus 1-2-3, see supra note 94, has
subsequently been sued by the creator of VisiCac who claims that Lotus 1-2-3
copied VisiCale. Recent Cases and Developments, 3 COPYRIGHT L.J. 89, 90
(1987).
150. One commentator advocates that a useful articles analysis be applied
to screens of application programs as a substitute for idea-expression analysis.
See Comment, supra note 98, at 134. A useful articles approach has at least
two problems. First, unlike a useful article which is purely functional, a dis-
play screen is not only functional, but also communicates to the user how the
program functions. Thus a screen does not fit within the traditional parame-
ters of a useful article. See supra note 30. Second, a useful articles analysis is
no improvement on the traditional idea-expression analysis because it is too
limited. The useful articles doctrine would only protect design or aesthetic as-
pects of a screen, and it is limited to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works.
The doctrine would not be workable with displays whose primary expression
is textual. Furthermore, although the useful articles analysis is perhaps less
ambiguous and easier to apply than an idea-expression analysis, it lacks the
flexibility to define the scope of protection in terms of the policies that inhere
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idea from copyrightable expression, as noted earlier,151 is a sub-
jective, policy-guided process. The idea-expression distinction
is, in essence, a metaphor for how much protection society
should extend to any particular type of work. Because the de-
marcation between expression and idea is policy based, it is an
ideal tool for restriction of copyright protection in situations in
which broad protection is unwarranted, as it is with computer
screens.
Furthermore, because the policy concerns previously dis-
cussed dictate limited protection for screens, courts should
shun broad, vague generalizations of a screen's idea such as
Broderbund's function test. Instead, courts should construe the
idea of a given screen display concretely and precisely to yield
only a limited range of copyrightable expression. 52
Assume, for example, that a developer copyrights a screen
designed for a program that provides general desktop functions
such as a weekly schedule, a telephone and address directory, a
note pad, and a calculator. The user directs the program to per-
form a specific function by moving the cursor to the desired
function, which is depicted graphically on the screen. Should a
court adopt the Broderbund court's approach and define the
idea of this screen abstractly at the level of the screen's func-
tion as "a screen which directs the user to various desktop func-
tions," choosing these functions by moving a cursor to a picture
of the desired operation could be protected expression because
it is not an essential means of carrying out the screen's idea.
Another developer would be hesitant to market a desktop pro-
gram that depicted its functions graphically and selected them
by moving a cursor to their picture. The function of the work
test is therefore too broad and too vague. A court could, how-
ever, define the idea of this screen more concretely as "a
method of choosing desktop operations by moving a cursor to a
picture of the desired operation." This would yield a narrower
scope of protected expression, encompassing the aesthetic as-
pects of the screen's design, such as the particular graphic rep-
resentations of the functions.
Because the idea-expression inquiry is necessarily work
specific, however, no single test for distinguishing idea from ex-
pression can be appropriate for all screen display cases. For ex-
in idea-expression formulations. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying
text.
151. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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ample, the Softklone court's test is not amenable to all
situations. Although Softklone's test, which distinguished man-
ner of operation from the communication of that operation,
works well for a screen designed to display and implement
commands, it would prove a poor test for screens that do not
perform operations. Thus, courts should distinguish idea from
expression in a manner appropriate to the individual character-
istics of the screens before them.
In addition to using a work-specific and concrete definition
of the idea of a program, a court should liberally apply the
merger doctrine to prevent developers from monopolizing lim-
ited ways of communicating with the user.153 Techniques such
as the highlighting of letters used in Softklone do not merit
copyright protection because the few methods of highlighting
letters would rapidly be appropriated by a few developers.M
Courts should find that the idea and expression have merged in
these situations to avoid unnecessary restrictions on screen
development.
CONCLUSION
Simple, efficient, and attractive screen displays are a major
asset of any software package, representing a substantial invest-
ment of creative resources. Current decisions of courts and the
Copyright Office, however, give developers inadequate and
sometimes conflicting guidance on copyright issues pertaining
to screens.
To alleviate this situation, courts and the Copyright Office
should treat screens and programs independently for registra-
tion and infringement analysis purposes, thus recognizing the
independent authorship and function of each. The scope of
153. See supra notes 20-21 for an overview of the merger and scenes afaire
doctrines. The scenes a faire doctrine can effectively exempt standard conven-
tions such as common command terms, common methods of effecting com-
mands, and basic screen format and layout from copyright protection. See
supra note 20. Some courts have applied the doctrine to the scope of copyright
protection for computer programs and screens. See Frybarger v. IBM Corp.,
812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987) (screen display of audiovisual game); Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986) (pro-
grams), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); Atari v. North Am. Philips Con-
sumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616-17 (7th Cir.) (screen display of
audiovisual game), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). The scenes a faire doc-
trine also provides a useful tool for limiting the copyright protection of screens
that contain desktop metaphors such as note pads and desk calendars, or
screens, like Broderbund's Print Shop, that use common pictorial symbols.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
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copyright protection given to screens, however, should be lim-
ited through the use of a heightened originality standard, a con-
crete, work-specific definition of the screen's idea, and less
grudging application of the merger doctrine. By granting cir-
cumscribed protection, courts will protect substantial aesthetic
developments while fostering vigorous competition in the com-
puter software industry and the standardization of basic user
interfaces.
Jeffrey R. Benson
